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be observed,felt, or handledin a concrete
way, gives rise to diversetheories of the
structureof number.
In most mathematicsdiscussionsthis
difficulty is pointed out rather vaguelyor
entirely overlooked. Attempts to clarify
the number structure fall into two broad
categories. Some define natural numbers
as the processof counting, a processindependent of time and spaceand an imme-

Mostmathematiciansand philosophers
considernumber to be a primitive concept.
That is, the concept of number cannot be
reducedto or identified with any concept
that is more primitive. The ideaof number
cannot be further defined with words
whosemost immediateintuitive meaningis
more obviousor basicthan the word number. This, coupled with the fact that
number is an abstractentity which cannot
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diate result of the laws of thought. As
Dedekind states: "Numbers are the free
creations of the human mind.'"
Others
say that natural numbers are a created
something which to be explained require
other related experiences. Hans Freudenthal, for example, describes this concept
as follows:
The singular 'number concept' is
misleading. There are many number concepts, both as regards
content and form, from methodological, genetic and didactic
viewpoints. A rough distinction
of the accessto the number concept would be:
a) Counting number: to begin with, this is the reeling
off in time of the sequence
of natura~ numbers. The

c) Measuring number: if a
magnitude is measured, it is
exhausted or tried to be exhausted by means of copies
of a unit, like a vessel is
emptied with a scoop.
d) Reckoning number: this
is the algorithmic aspect.
The number is operationally
comprehended, by rules according to which the user
plays with it.2
Both approaches give inadequate answers to the question: What is number? If
number is only a creation of the human
mind, then is there no structure to this
concept other than that democratically
agreed upon by mathematicians through
the ages? If number is defined to be an
ordinal number, cardinal number, rational

first steps of which are as
arduous for children aslearning the names of colours
and letters, until they suddenly grasp the whole unlimitedly
continuing
sequence. A conceptual seizure that has no analogue in
learning the names of colours and letters.
b) Numerosity number: perhapsthe numerosity number
is genetically earlier than
the counting number. Animals recognize small numerosities though they certainly
cannot count.

number, or an element of a ring or field
axiomatically fixed, then againthe question:
What is number? has no clear precise
answer, but hinges upon the way the concept is used. It then becomes a relative
concept.
The purpose of this paper is to give a
succinct, brief analysis of the essence of
number. This analysis does not replace or
contradict the theories discussedabove, but
is an attempt to get at a biblically based
prior concept out of which the theory of
numbers can be developed.
Before undertaking this analysis, there
are three basic givens which set the perspective for this discussion. First, on the
basis of a faith comm itment and without
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further argument, we will assume that
number is a created entity, not merely
a result of man's ingenuity. Second,we
believe that the number aspect is not an
arbitrary structure,but is, like all of creation
subject to law. Numberwasordainedto be
number by the Creator, who also sustains
this identity within the creationeventhough
there isconsiderablediversity and confusion
within human experienceand culture asto
its precise meaning. Third, number is,
alwayshas been,and will continue to be a
distinct aspectof the creation distinguishable from all other basic entities in the
creation in at least one fundamental respect. Equivalently, number is an irreducible aspectof the creation.
From the history of mathematicsand
a study of the developmentof number in
the various civilizations and cultures, it
becomesquite obvious that the idea of
number was not always as we know it
today. This should not be surprising,as
it is a direct corollary of the cultural
mandate. If man was given the command
to work in the creation, there certainly
would be work to do and something to
develop.
Man from the time of creation apparently had a very naive number senseand
could intlJit the equivalencerelation, a
one-to-one or counting relation, between
a pile of stonesand a flock of sheep,for
example. At somepoint in time, however,
it first occurredto man to make a symbol
to representthis number rather than a pile
of stones.Thiscould be consideredthe first
step of abstracting. Such insightsdid not
completely exhaust the meaningand character of number nor the extent of its usefulness. Theexplorationof the quantitative
relations which exist in the creation and
impose themselveson man in his cultural
activitiescontinued.
In the areaof mathematics,the Greeks
were the first civilization to develop an
abstract,structured,mathematical,philosophical, and scientific system. To them,
number was the most basic unit of a
substance. They held this view because
mathematicsto them was the languageof

the universe. Number was consideredthe
basic counting unit, the basic geometric
unit, and the basicphysicalunit. (Wenow
identify the latter two aspoint and atom or
element respectively.) Through further
theoretic and scientific developments,it
becameapparentthat the entities number,
point, and atom were not identical.
\

Arithmeticfor theGreekswasbasically

a discrete,finite theory, and problemsarose
when points on a line were matchedon a
one-to-onebasiswith the points on a longer
line (leno's Paradox)or when diagonalsof
squareswere measuredwith the sameunits
as those used to measurethe side of the
samesquare.
Theproblemthey overlookedwasthat
number is a distinct entity not reducibleto

other equally irreducible entities. The following may illustrate this point. The symbol 1 standing alone conveys an immediate
concept to each observerin western culture.
If, however, this symbol is associated with
each of the following-(1,-),
(1,!:J.),(1,0)the most immediate concept is different in
each of the three symbols. Even though
these three entities all have a measure of 1,
the line segment, the triangle, and the
square each adds a new and distinct dimension to the concept which the symbol 1,
alone, cannot convey. By way of contradiction, one might argue that if the symbol
1 were sufficient to represent all three
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ideas,they should be distinguishablesolely
on that basis. Obviously they are not.
Therefore,there is a different aspectentering the discussion,namely the size and
shape of the space enclosed. In other
words, the number concept cannot completely describethe amount of information
contained in a discussionabout space. A
unit of measurementis one way of accounting for this distinct aspect.
The developmentof measuringunits
hasa long history and is closelytied to the
theories of science. But even in the labels

All of these examples point out the
fact that we live in, are part of, and respond
to a creation where distinctions are possible
and are consciously or unconsciously made
to avoid confusion. The reasonsfor these

used to identify the units of time, space,
velocity, and force, to name just a few, we
see evidence of the irreducibility of one
creational aspect to that of another. This
the Greeks did not recognize.
In arithmetic, that is, in operations
with numerals, number symbols, we need
no units description. One object is represented by the symbol 1. But in geometry,
the science of space, we commonly assign
very specific types of units such as 1 inch,
1 square foot, or 1 cubic yard, to name
only a few. When studying physical phenomena-that is, when mass is involved-we
customarily usea different set of units, such
as 1 pound, 1 gram, or similar weight or
mass units. The units change again for the
study of the motion of a point. Here we
use 1 inch per second or 1 mile per hour
and so on; and the units change once more
as we discussthe r:notion of a mass-particle,
when the units used are 1 foot-pound per
second or 1 dyne, newton, or horsepower.

Only man has the ability to abstract
and symbolize number, but experiments
with animals show that the numerical sense
is not unique to man. It is a created entity
evidenced in many ways in the creation.
Some plants show a unique number relation, called the Fibonnaci Sequence in the
number of leaves and branches the plant
develops and their relative positions on the
plant. Robins usually lay four eggs. Experimenters have removed one egg from the
nest and the mother robin lays another,
repeatedly. Even though the conclusions
are controversial and other plausible explanations might be offered, there is accumulated a mass of evidence supporting
the belief that certain birds, certain mammals, and certain arthropods perhaps have
a number sense. The following anecdote
may more directly illustrate the point.
There is a touching and authentic
story about a bird that seemedto
possessa number sense. A squire

distinctions cannot always be proven logically or derived,but are often an intuitive
response to a matter of fact. The history
of natural science and mathematics gives
many examples of where not making such
distinctions has resulted in confusion and
loss of direction in the development of the
science.
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try to imposemathematicalconceptson a
child prematurely, his learning is merely
verbal; true understandingof them comes
only with his mental growth.,,4 From this
statement,which summarizesmost parents'
experienceswhen teachinga child how to
count, it is quite obvious that the raw
material for the developmentof the number conceptis inherently presentbeforethe
child is ready to handle the concept abstractly. Many types of experimentshave
beenconductedwhich~howthat a child can
carry out the basiccounting process,setting
a one-to-onecorrespondencebetweenobjects, before that child can verbalize, or
through rational action, illustrate the process.
Wealwaysdealwith numbersabstractIy, and attemptsto makethe ideaconcrete
fail becausethere is no specificthing which
can be identified uniquely with the concept
number. It is for this reasonthat number
is so very difficult to describe. This is not
the casefor the other basic mathematical
concepts. A point in space,for example,
can be illustrated as the place where two
walls and the ceiling of a room meet. This
concretizesthe conceptof point. But there
is no suchrepresentationof number.
This problem is bothersometo mathematiciansin generaland can be summarized
by the following statementby Kuyk:
The questionwhether it is possible to make some kind of ontology the basisof modern mathematics is left open by most people working in the mathematical
fields. Fearingto introduce into
mathematicsargumentsof a metaphysical nature, the philosophically minded mathematicianwill
avoid as much as possiblereference to mathematicalexistence
independentof human thought.
In general it can be said that
under the impact of the pragmatist attitude, for the philosopher of mathematicsthe workaability of mathematicalsystems
rather than their interpretability
has become a central point of

in Scot!and became annoyed by
a raucous crow that had made its
nest in the watchtower of his
estate, and he determined to
shoot the bird. Repeatedly he
tried to enter the tower to kill
the bird, but each time at the
man's approach the crow would
leave its nest and take up a
watchful position in a distant
tree. When the wearied squire
would leave the tower, the bird
would return to its nest. Not
wishing to be outsmarted by a
bird, the squire resor~ed to a
ruse. He secured the assistance
of a neighbor one day. The two
men entered the tower,' one man
came out and went away, and
the other remair1edwithin. But
the crow was not deceived; it
stayed in the distant tree until
the man within the tower came
out. The experiment now became a contest, and the next
day three men entered the tower,
two came out and went away,
and the third waited within. But
the crow was not fooled; it
remained il:l the distant tree until
the man within the tower came
out. The next day the experiment was repeated with fou r
men, but still without success.
Finally five men entered the
tower, four came out and went
away, and the fifth remained
inside. At this point the crow
seemed to have lost count and,
unable to distinguish between
four and five, it returned to its
nest in the tower.3
To develop further background and
insight into the essenceof number, we look
at how children learn numbers. Piaget says,
"It is a great mistake to suppose that a
child acquires the notion of number and
other mathematical concepts just from
teaching. On the contrary, to a remarkable
degree he develops them himself, independently and spontaneously. When adults
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formed the cosmosand eachrock, plant,
and creature in it, he was concernedwith
the details of His creation. Implicit in the
"And God saw that it was good," is the
identificationof eachof the productsof His
handiwork and the knowledgeof what it
was. Explicit in the "All accordingto their
kind" is the fact of differentiation, distinction, and distinguishability. Thesetwo
phrasescarry with them the very direct
message
of identity. Whateverwascreated,
was done so accordingto the way in which
God intended it, and could neverbe otherwise. With this attribute present in the
creation, it is possibleto makedistinctions,
selections,and choices.
Fundamentally,the aspectof the number "one" is abstracted,through identification and selection,from an integral object
in the horizon of immediateexperience,in
distinction from all other aspectsof that
object. Very simply, it is the processof
saying "this one" and not "that one."
Piagetexpandson this asfollows:
In analysing the beginningsof
quantification, we find ourselves
confronted with the problem of
correspondence.To comparetwo
quantities is indeed either to
comparetheir dimensions,or to
make a one-to-one correspondencebetweenthe elements.As a
result of the work of Cantor,the
second of these processeshas
been seento be fundamentalto
the construction of the integer,
since it providesthe simplestand
most direct measurementof the
equivalenceof two sets.6
Identification of a singleobject carries
with it the numberone. Repeatedidentifications give rise to correspondences
and,
hence,to the construction of the integers.
The reasonfor discussingthe numberconcept in terms of the number "one" is that
most discussionsof this type begin with
two or more and then attempt to definethe
processof counting and also numbers in
terms of classification sets or equivalent
sets. This brings one too quickly to the
processof counting, without clearly illus-

view. Reflections of an epistemologicalnatureaswell asreflections regarding for example
mathematicaltruth arenot readily
undertaken by mathematicians
of the pragmatistictype.5
To break with the usual ontology of
number, whether intuitionistic, logistic, or
formalistic, it will be necessary
to recognize
first that the idea of natural number
cannot be defined. The concept of the
natural number "one" cannot be reduced
to or identified with any concept that is
more primitive. Moreover,we will recognize the existenceof number independent

of human thought. Number is a concept
integral to the whole of creation and man
structures this and other mathematical concepts appropriately only when he does so
according to the laws placed in the creation
by the Creator.
Since number is a primitive concept,
our discussion of what is number cannot be
further refined by definition, but will have
to take the form of ontology by creation
laws or norms. The concept of number can
only be recognized as existing, and hence as
mathematical truth, because it was created
so, and it can be described only in terms of
a set of boundaries or laws beyond which
the entity ceasesto be number.
Within this context, I believe,the idea
of number derives its meaning out of the
created fact of identity. When the Creator
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trating the concept of number. The previous quotation of Piaget and the following
of Richard Copeland illustrate this tendency.
Classification is based on properties shared in common by a set of
objects such as size, shape, color,
or warm-blooded.
Number is
also a property of any class or
set of objects. We may compare
sets of objects and say that they
have the same number or the
same number property.
But
number, unlike the objects themselvesis abstract.7
Here the concept, number, is characterized as a property associated with all
sets having the same property. This somewhat nebulous statement again relativizes
the structure of number.
. Viewed, however, as repeated identifications of integral objects of one set
compared or put into correspondence with
integral objects of another set, the process
of counting now takes the form of constructing a sequence of symbols in which
each successor is one more than its predecessor. In this process, the number one
becomes the basic unit, which, as I have
attempted to show, is the focal point of
this analysis. The expanded structures of
negative numbers, ratiohal numbers, and
irrational numbers do not change significantly with this approach. The argument
is more meta-mathematical than it is mathematical.
It must be noted, too, that we make an
error if we assume number and identity to
be coterminus or even equivalent. The
implication should be clear that while
number exists because things can be identified and distinguished, the converse is
not necessarily true. Number is an element
of the set of all methods of identification.
It is only one such method and does not
includ~ all other methods.
This is a
common error made in society today,
where quantification and number identification are made the goal of an efficient
society, such as the social security number,
implicitly assumed to be a requisite for
full citizenship.

I n the area of pedagogical methods in
arithmetic, we note that set theory per se
cannot and will not be the basisfor number
concepts. Number concepts and the arithmetic operations of numbers can be clarified and illustrated by using sets, but not
defined or derived from set theory. This
may be one of the problems associated
with the so-called "new math" programs,
where sets are made the basis for the
number concept, rather than a method of
illustrating this concept.
Even though the number concept is
very difficult to define and discussand has
eluded mathematicians and philosophers
over the centuries, we should not hesitate
to clarify this concept. Number is a part of
God's creation given to us to use to His
glory. If we make number abstract and
elusive, when it is in fact a very naive and
intuitive sensegiven to man to use, we are
remiss in overlooking its simple beauty. If
we keep this in mind,. however, we may well
increase the effectiveness of our service to
God and our fellowman.
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